DBS, Personal Identity, and Diachronic Value by McConnell, Doug
This article was downloaded by: [Doug McConnell]
On: 02 May 2013, At: 18:37
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,
37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
AJOB Neuroscience
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uabn20
DBS, Personal Identity, and Diachronic Value
Doug McConnell a
a Macquarie University
To cite this article: Doug McConnell (2013): DBS, Personal Identity, and Diachronic Value, AJOB Neuroscience, 4:2, 47-49
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2013.782908
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic
reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to
anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents
will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should
be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims,
proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in
connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
AJOB Neuroscience, 4(2): 47–62, 2013
Copyright c© Taylor & Francis Group, LLC






This open peer commentary further pursues the question of
whether deepbrain stimulation (DBS) of the nucleus accum-
bens (NAc) and hypothalamus for treatment of addiction
and binge eating threatens personal identity. The theoreti-
cal basis for expecting effects to personal identity, besides
the desired therapeutic effect, is that both brain regions are
involved in much more than controlling drug use and eat-
ing. The NAc, in particular, is involved in the experience
of reward and is thus implicated in all goal-directed activ-
ities. Empirically, treatment of these brain regions has de-
creased sexual drive andpleasure from the taste and smell of
cigarettes.1 DBS patients in general also report, “I don’t feel
like myself anymore” and, “I feel like a robot” (Schu¨pbach
et al. 2006, 1813). So shouldwebe concerned about the threat
to patient personal identity when using DBS for addiction
and binge eating?
First, a definition of what counts as a threat to personal
identity will be helpful. I take it that personal identity is
threatened when agency is undermined so that the person
struggles tomeaningfully contribute to the authoring of her
or his own life, particularly the creation and pursuit of her
or his values. As the ability to contribute to the process of
identity formation decreases, the agent loses the ability to
create or hold on to a sense of who she or he is (Baylis 2011,
13).2
Here I argue for two points. First, pathological
overeaters and addicts typically suffer from damaged per-
sonal identities, primarily because they cannot pursue di-
achronic value. If DBS helps reconnect agents with their
diachronic values, then it helps repair their personal identi-
ties. The side effect of decreased pleasure appears trivial in
this context. Second, because the appreciation of diachronic
value is partially independent of the reward systems of the
brain, such appreciation (and associated recovery from ad-
1. More dramatic personality changes have been observed in the treatment of Parkinson’s disease with DBS, such as megalomania,
depression, speech slurring, and loss of the ability to taste or smell, although the target brain area and prognoses are quite different in
those cases.
2. In the philosophical literature a change in personal identity is often taken to mean that one person literally changes into another person.
Perhaps this is possible with a dramatic and unintelligible change in personality and value, but I assume DBS does not pose a threat of
that magnitude (see Baylis 2011).
3. Willing addicts balance their drug use with their other values to their own satisfaction or value drug use almost exclusively. They may
or may not be self-deceived.
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diction and binge eating) should be somewhat resilient in
the face of reduced visceral pleasure.
DBS IN THE CONTEXT OF DAMAGED
PERSONAL IDENTITY
When considering how serious the threat to personal iden-
titymight be, it’s important to consider the personal identity
of these patients. Setting aside cases of willing3 addicts, ad-
dicted persons and overeaters are struggling to pursue their
values (author their lives) because of their habits. This is es-
pecially the case for severe and refractory addicts whose
personal identities become threadbare. Their lives are dom-
inated by a cyclical pattern of relatively synchronic goals,
get drugs and use drugs, even though they ceased to value
those activities long ago. Meanwhile, pursuit of the values
they retain is rendered impossible or put on indefinite hold.
Because successful pursuit of valued goals is one of the
most important aspects of self-authorship, these disorders
damage and diminish personal identity.
But these disorders don’t damage all values equally;
they tend to damage values that dependondiachronic plans
more severely than synchronically accessible values. Ad-
diction in particular is infamous for damaging careers and
relationships (diachronic values) more severely than enjoy-
ment of food and sex (synchronic values). This is because
diachronic values are more vulnerable and more difficult
to repair; although they take much planning and effort to
build, they can be swiftly torn down. A successful career,
for example, requires years of effort but it can be ruined by a
single drug conviction. The appetites on which synchronic
values are based tend to returnwithout planning and effort,
but one’s wife, children, and employer do not. This is par-
ticularly tragic because people tend to rank their diachronic


























because diachronic values set one apart from others and are
thus an essential part of personal identity. Almost everyone
enjoys food, drink, and sex, but only one person can, say, be
the first to climb Mt. Everest, marry that person, have those
children. Therefore, diachronic values form the bedrock of
personal identity; they take effort to build but are easily
eroded or destroyed by addiction and, to some extent, by
binge eating.
Recovery, therefore, involves (re)building one’s di-
achronic values and thereby one’s personal identity. No
wonder that patients claim that treatment of their under-
lying disease will allow their true identity to be assumed4
and that recovering addicts often talk of (re)discovering con-
nections to life and meaning and (re)developing a “sense of
themselves that iswhole and entire” (Addenbrooke 2011, 164,
my emphasis). Finding meaning in particular is a necessar-
ily diachronic endeavor because present events take their
significance from their diachronic context (a cornerstone of
narrative self-constitution views; e.g.; Nelson 2001; Schecht-
man 1996) For example, being reunitedwith one’s wife after
the war has meaning that meeting an attractive stranger on
the street doesn’t.
In this context, should DBS be efficacious, thenmost ad-
dicts will likely see the threat DBS poses to personal iden-
tity as trivial, given the potential for personal restoration
and redevelopment. Reduction in the enjoyment of syn-
chronic pleasures and sometimes feeling like a robot are
relatively small prices to pay for the chance to (re)develop
the diachronic values of a relationship with your children,
a career, and so on. Of course, this conclusion has to be tem-
pered somewhat. Some people may not value diachronic
goals over synchronic goals, and for them the costs of DBS
may be too high. As the authors note, the patient can choose
and, in any case, the treatment is reversible. We also don’t
yet have a good appreciation of themagnitude and range of
side effects DBS might cause, but it seems they will have to
be much more significant than current indications suggest
to make acute, refractory addicts balk. It’s also important
to note that DBS will not, itself, rebuild the meaningful di-
achronic connections so crucial to personal identity. The
exact mechanism by which DBS would work is unclear, but
it might inhibit craving, reduce the strength of cues, and/or
reduce the synchronic pleasure from drug use or binge eat-
ing. All these effects would help provide the opportunity
to (re)develop a diachronic network of meaningful con-
nections but wouldn’t actually provide those connections;
that remains the task of the agent and the agent’s social
network.
VARIETIES OF POSITIVE EXPERIENCE
There might be some concern that reducing the experience
of rewardwill necessarily reduce the experience of all value,
so DBS in these indications will be self-defeating; the agent
4. That’s not to say that we each have an essential, underlying true
identity, but that whatever set of diachronic values the agent devel-
ops without being coerced just will be that person’s true identity
because that person created it.
wouldn’t draw pleasure fromdrugs or binge eating but also
wouldn’t draw pleasure from anything. The authors suggest
that DBS may provide a perception of pleasure that substi-
tutes for the pleasure of drug use or highly caloric food. As
it happens, there is a source of positive experience in daily
life that doesn’t completely depend on the reward systems
of the brain. DBS doesn’t provide this positive experience
but it might help the patient access it.
Besides pleasure from the reward systems of the brain,
positive experience can be gained by knowing one’s long-
termplans are on track or havebeen successfully completed,
for example, one’s children are happy, one got the promo-
tion onewas working toward. The phenomenology of these
experiences seems distinct in kind from the visceral, syn-
chronic pleasures of food, drink, and sex. Positive expe-
riences involving diachronic values and their magnitude
depend on creating and referencing a diachronic context
for one’s life, which is why being reunited with one’s wife
after the war is so much better than just seeing her after
work or meeting an attractive stranger on the street. Given
that different areas of the brain are responsible for creat-
ing and referencing biographical context, we can assume
DBS to the NAc or hypothalamus won’t affect awareness
of one’s context and plans and so won’t dampen this as-
pect of positive experience. Of course, being reunited with
one’s wife would feel even betterwith a stronger synchronic
pleasure response, but we don’t need that dopamine hit
to know that this experience is valuable. We know that it
is valuable because we can understand the place of the
current event in a diachronic trajectory with good out-
comes. So some decrease in pleasure responses will not
necessarily affect some of the most important feelings of
satisfaction to be gained from pursuing diachronic values
central to personal identity. That said, some visceral plea-
sure responses are essential. Feeling no visceral pleasure
when being reunited with one’s wife would make for an
alien experience, as if one was an imposter reuniting with
someone else’s wife. Similarly, people suffering from de-
pression can understand what their values require of them,
but they feel disconnected and struggle to be relevantly
motivated. If DBS had these stronger effects, then it would
contribute to undermining diachronic goals and thus be
self-defeating after all. Here we must wait on empirical
evidence.
In summary, the damaged personal identities common
in addicts and overeaters provide a context in which the
potential benefits of DBS to personal identity are significant
while the threats appear relatively trivial. Furthermore, the
appreciation of diachronic value is semi-independent of the
synchronic pleasure generated by the reward systems of
the brain, so should be somewhat resilient in the face of a
reduced visceral pleasure response.
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Autonomy and DBS Treatment
for Addicts
Susanne Uusitalo, University of Turku
Many have expressed skepticism about gaining informed
consent in particular from addicts, as addiction has been
associated with poor decision-making and problems about
diminished autonomy. This has been explained by referring
to compulsive substance use in addicts and/or deficient
rationality in their decision-making. These result in loss of
autonomybecause of inadequate competence. This is a com-
mon idea (see, e.g., Mu¨ller et al. 2012, 7).
The need for treatment for addicts is a focal issue and
new forms of treatment are called for (seeMu¨ller et al. 2012).
Therefore, exploring the conceptual aspects that concern
the ethics of these novel ways is of utmost importance. The
preliminary results of deep brain stimulation (DBS) in pro-
viding fruitful treatment for addicts and people suffering
from overeating associated with obesity seem promising,
and many see it as a step or a means to individuals suffer-
ing from these disorders to “gain full autonomy” (Mu¨ller
et al. 2012, 7) or “allow their true selves to be assumedagain”
(ibid. 8).
In light of these references to autonomy and self-
government, I briefly highlight the importance of distin-
guishing difficulty from freedom in making autonomous
choices, as it bears relevance to ethical concerns that touch
upon several issues related to DBS and addiction and the
justification behind the treatment. With the DBS treatment-
related remission in substance use, I am skeptical in partic-
ular whether the absence of craving then actuallymakes the
agent more autonomous. This is because the felt cravings
do not make it impossible for the agent to choose to refrain
from satisfying the urge, as Hanna Pickard (2012) has ar-
gued, but rather, it is more difficult to do so. Granted that
individualswith little self-control have a tendency to choose
according to whatever is the easiest (most convenient) way
of acting, DBS surely facilitates their chosen path (of not sat-
isfying the desire to eat more or feed their addiction), as the
desires will be reduced. However, distinguishing difficulty
from coercion in this context is important. If I do a difficult
Sudoku, a Japanese puzzle, in the morning, my autonomy
is not diminished because of its difficulty. It just takes more
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effort, but my decision to engage in that task is not less au-
tonomous than with an easier Sudoku. (It could be argued
that had I more skills, it would be less difficult. The more
skills that I have, the more Sudokus I can solve, and this im-
proves my autonomy in some sense. In any case, the issue
of having skills to solve puzzles does not concern coercion
but difficulty.)
The same distinction applies when I try to write this
commentary and my colleague is constantly asking ques-
tions while I am writing. (This example is an analogy to
drug-related attentional bias understood as “noise”; see
more on attentional bias, for instance in Field andCox [2008]
and more on “noise” [Uusitalo unpublished].) The effort to
engage in commentary writing requires more effort, but my
colleague’s inquiries do not undermine my autonomy.
According to Pickard (2012), the challenges addiction
imposes on agents are not overpowering forces that merely
sweepover the agent, but rather that peoplewho suffer from
loss of control in addiction tend to suffer frompsychiatric co-
morbidities. Addicts are, nevertheless, agents and their ad-
dictive action is purposive. With the DBS treatment-related
remission in substance use (Mu¨ller et al. 2012), one could
think that the (full) agency of addicts is restored. However,
to assume that the absence of craving actually makes the
agent more autonomous should be considered more care-
fully. What does this autonomy mean here? Granted, the
remission or lack of cravingmakes the decisionmaking and
everyday living easier, but whether it actually makes differ-
ence in the ways in which the addict reasons is a stronger
claim. Addicts’ reasons for action cannot simply be reduced
to cue-related impulsivity (cf. Neale, Nettleton, and Pick-
ering 2012). The reasons for having addiction count, too,
as Pickard (2012) has laid out in discussing the purpose
of addiction. The motivation that addicts may lack toward
getting rid of addiction may be difficult to gain by merely
eliminating craving. The problem is not a question of free-
dom (see Uusitalo et al. 2013). Rather, there is a danger of
arguing for improving an agent’s autonomy by helping his
or her “true self” to become effective.
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